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Abstract. Combat is formulated as a dynamical encounter between two 
opponents, each of whom has offensive capabilities and objectives. With 
each opponent is associated a target in the event space in which he 
endeavors to terminate the combat, thereby winning. If the combat 
terminates in both target sets simultaneously or in neither, a joint 
capture or a draw, respectively, is said to occur. Resolution of the 
encounter is formulated as a combat game; namely, as a pair of competing 
event-constrained differential games. If exactly one of the players 
can win, the optimal strategies are determined from a resulting 
constrained zero-sum-differential game. Otherwise, ------- the optimal 
strategies are computed from a resulting non-zero-sum game. Since 
optimal combat strategies frequently may not exist, approximate combat 
games are also formulated leading to approximate optimal strategies. To 
illustrate combat games, an example, called the turret game, is 
considered. This game may be thought of as a highly simplified model of 
air combat, yet it sufficiently complex to exhibit a rich variety of 
combat behavior, much of which is not found in pursuit-evasion games. 
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SUMMARY 
Most investigations which use the theory of dif- 
ferential games to analyze combat problems have 
focused on deterministic, two-person, zero-sum, 
perfect-information pursuit-evasion games. This 
framework is quite suitable when the pursuer- 
evader roles are well defined by the nature of the 
problem and the evader has no offensive capability 
with which to threaten the pursuer to affect the 
outcome. The formulation is, however, inadequate 
to model combat between two (or more) opponents 
when both (or all) have offensive capabilities and 
objectives. An obvious example of such a situ- 
ation is air-to-air combat. The few attempts to 
analyze this more general combat problem have used 
either concepts of role-determination or, more 
recently, that of a two-target differential game. 
Neither of these approaches, however, has led to a 
complete and consistent conceptual definition and 
corresponding mathematical theory of combat games. 
It is our purpose in this lecture to formulate and 
illustrate such a theory. 
We begin with a discussion of the qualitative fea- 
tures of combat games between two aggressive 
opponents; this discussion indicates the rich 
variety of behavior present in such games and 
makes clear the inadequacy of the pursuit-evasion 
assumption, with or without role determination, 
for modelina combat. We then orovose a mathe- 
matical for&lation of determinisiic combat games 
between two opponents with offensive capabilities 
and offensive objectives. 
By a game of combat we intuitively refer to an 
encounter between two hostile adversaries, or 
players, each of whom wishes to capture the other 
*This research was sponsored by the NASA Ames 
Research Center. 
while,if possible, ensuring his own survivial. A 
player who succeeds in capturing his opponent is 
said to win the game; if he can win, he will try 7 
to win with as little cost to himself as possible. 
If he is unable to do so. he will try to make his 
;;;;;'nt's win as difficult or as costly as pos- 
Resolution of the combat essentially involves 
solving two differential games with state con- 
straints. Depending on the 'game dynamics and 
parameters, the combat can terminate in one of 
four ways: (1) the first player wins, (2) the 
second player wins, (3) a draw (neither wins), or 
(4) joint capture. In the first two cases, the 
optimal strategies of the two players are deter- 
mined from suitable zero-sum games; whereas, in 
the latter two cases. the relevant game iS non- 
zero-sum. Next, to avoid certain technical diffi- 
culties, the concept of an approximate combat is 
introduced. 
To illustrate the definition, formulation, and so- 
lution of combat games, an example, called the 
turret game, is analyzed in detail. This game may 
be thought of as a highly simplified model of air 
combat, yet it is sufficiently complex to exhibit 
a rich variety of combat behavior, much of which 
is not found in pure pursuit-evasion games. 
The most distinctive feature of combat is the role 
of threat for optimal strategy selection. Gen- 
erally, both players combine offensive and defen- 
sive behavior in their optimal strategies. The 
winning player, during his offense, takes defen- 
sive measures to avoid being captured himself. 
At the same time, the losing player, usually 
thought of as defensive, applies a threat to the 
winner. That is, he also implements his offen- 
sive capability in order to prevent his opponent 
from using the most damaging strategies (in terms 
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of the formulated game's cost). In a properly 
formulated combat game, just as in actual combat, 
both players combine a suitable blend of offensive 
and defensive maneuvering. 
The details of our formulation and analysis of 
combat games may be found in the references below. 
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